## Clearance Record DOCUMENT COMMENT LOG

Originating Office:
AIR-110

Document Description:
Order 8100.15B Chg 1 – Organization Designation
Authorization Procedures

Occurrent Description:
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Authorization Procedures

Lead Reviewer:
Suspense Date:
June 28, 2013

Commenter	Page	Paragraph	Comment	Suggested Change	FAA Response
Airbus SAS	All	All	General comment: In this 8100.15B Change 1, Airbus finds more detailed guidelines & information from experience feedback on the ODA implementation. This is helpful to understand this ODA system.	N/A	Comment Noted.
Airbus SAS	All	All	General comment: As required by EU 748/2012 Part 21, an EASA DOA holder shall demonstrate the satisfactory integration of its Partners/subcontractors within its Design Assurance System. No matter the Partner/Subcontractor are DOA holders or not, the qualification, selection and surveillance as well as the Work Package (WP) specification including the evaluation of critical level of the WP, supplier's performance are fully under the DOA holder's responsibility (as design holder).  For ODA approach, is it possible in the 8110.15 to enhance the ODA holder's responsibility to balance the FAA's role for suppliers' oversight since finally it is the TC holder who undertakes the responsibility of demonstration of compliance with applicable airworthiness code?  The Appendix B is about the ODA holder's Manual, but the §7 "ODA unit selection procedure" or §19 "Supplier Control" contain FAA process of control but not concern ODA holder's activities for the control of supplier. Is it possible to introduce more Supplier surveillance information handled by the ODA holder to give more visibility to FAA, thus reduce	N/A	The available ODA functions are the inspection, examination and test activities which are performed on behalf of the FAA in order for the FAA to issue a certificate or approval. As such, on-going supplier performance and supplier surveillance would not be delegated functions. The FAA is considering other ways to leverage certificate applicants and holders to perform or be responsible for evaluation of activities that are important to the continued quality of a design or production but are not part of the information that is submitted to obtain the certificate or approval.  No change has been introduced based on this comment.

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			also FAA's workload or prioritize this oversight work? For example, In the Section 19 of Appendix B, it describe FAA access to all suppliers, but we could not find the ODA holders' role in supplier surveillance, investigation, as well as interface control activities, e.g. using common or equivalent procedure / design standard. Was this intentionally?		
Airbus SAS	i	3.a.	As stated in "a. Revises paragraph 3-9b and appendix B to clarify the types of ODA manual revisions which may be incorporated by the ODA holder without FAA review", but Paragraph 3-9b could not be found changed in the document. Does it mean paragraph 3-9 a. (3) (b) on page 3-7? If yes, no further comment on the change.	N/A	Commenter is correct. We have revised the explanation of changes to refer to paragraph 3-9a.
Airbus SAS	i	3.f.	As stated in "f. Revises paragraph 5-10d to provide for notification of proposed DIN tracking to a removed unit member whose performance is determined to be misconduct", but Paragraph 5-10d could not be found.	N/A	Typographical error in reference-we have revised reference to paragraph 5-6d. The language was in proposed change on page 5-10.
Airbus SAS	3-9	Para C. (a)(b)(c)	Editorial comment to eliminate potential for confusion.	Airbus suggests to place the parenthesis to distinguish it as being part "C. FAA Seminars (2) (a), (b)" of the function code: typo error in "c. ODA unit members performing" should read "(c) ODA unit members performing"	Commenter is correct in that para. C. is mislabelled. We-have revised it to the correct subparagraph- (3).
Bob Miller	3-14	g.	This paragraph is talking about UMs and the listing, not ODA performance. It would seem that the wording would be in the context of the UM, not the ODA  IS: The OMT must be notified and provided contact information for the individual if the removal of a unit member from the active listing was based on ODA related performance. (See paragraph 5-6d(5)	removal of a unit member from the active listing was based on UM related performance.	The FAA prefers the description as ODA-related performance.  There should be no difference between ODA-related performance and unit member related performance when considering the actions of an individual unit member.  No change has been introduced based on this comment.

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			of this order.)		
Boeing Commercial Airplanes	3-10	3-10.c.(2)(b)	The wording in the proposed Order indicates that Unit Members must take a web-based course if they are authorized only to perform airworthiness approvals or conformity inspections within the ODA Unit. However, some ODAs have DARs that may be limited to only airworthiness approvals or conformity inspections within the ODA, but may have DAR Function Codes that require attendance at Aircraft Certification Recurrent Training Seminars every three years. Our suggested revision distinguishes these cases.	We recommend revising the text to read as follows:  "(b) Another exception currently applies to those UMs who only perform airworthiness approvals or conformity inspections of engines, propellers, and articles. For those UM's that are not required by any other authorization to attend an FAA Recurrent Seminar (i.e. DAR-F, DAR-T or DMIR authorization), After after completion of their initial unit member training, these unit members will be granted access to the web-based Recurrent Manufacturing ODA Unit Member Course as their designated recurrent training. This web-based course is the only recurrent training option for these unit members."	The FAA does not agree with the proposed change. Any responsibilities and training requirement for DAR functions an individual might have are separate and apart. DAR training for these functions may not be credited or substituted for the required Recurrent ODA Unit Member Course.  Based on other recent feedback, we are revising paragraph 3-10.c(2)(b) as follows.  "ODA Unit members who only perform original airworthiness approvals or conformity inspections of engines, propellers and articles, must complete the web-based Recurrent Manufacturing ODA Unit Member Course as their recurrent training rather than the "Recurrent Engines, Propellers, and Articles Seminar" required by Order 8100.8. This course is not required for ODA unit members authorized to perform recurrent airworthiness functions or those unit members authorized to perform conformity and/or original airworthiness functions on a complete aircraft, who must attend the appropriate Recurrent Aircraft Certification Seminar.
Airbus SAS	3-14	3.13. g.	After reading the context of 5-6d(5) of this order as well as previous version of 8100.15 paragraph 3-19, please see Change proposal in <b>bold/underlined</b> for precision that the removal of this ODA member is this individual quoted in the section below but not anyone else.	Suggestion for change:  Quote  g. ODA Unit Member Listing. The ODA holder must maintain a listing of active ODA unit members. The listing may be in any format acceptable to the	The proposed language has been agreed-to by FAA management and labor committee. While we appreciate the commenter's suggestion, we feel the proposed language is adequate.  No change has been introduced based on this comment.

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				OMT and must be provided to the OMT as required. The OMT must be notified and provided contact information for the individual if the removal of this individual as a unit member from the active listing was based on ODA related performance. (See paragraph 5-6d(5) of this order.)  Unquote	
Airbus SAS	5-5	5.4.e.	According to latest EASA and FAA discussion on future SMS implementation as per ICAO Annex 19, EASA LOI concept, as well as FAA 21 ARC SMS outcomes, it is better to introduce the Safety Risk oversight concept in the FAA guideline in 8100.15B to prepare the smooth phase in the safety Management for design and manufacture.	Airbus proposes to add "safety risk" (see bolt/underligned text) in the last sentence of 5.4.e., to read:  Quote  e. Manufacturing Supervision.  OMT representatives oversee  ODA manufacturing activity primarily through direct interaction with the ODA unit.  While it may be possible for manufacturing OMT representatives to complete some supervision through documents review, onsite visits are still required. These visits are in addition to any other ODA inspection requirements in this order. Manufacturing OMT representative visits to a facility will vary from a minimum of one per fiscal year, to as often as necessary, based on size, activity, complexity, safety risk, and past performance of an ODA	The FAA does not agree with the suggested change.  While we appreciate the commenter's desire, and acknowledge that safety risk is an inherent determinant in establishing the level of supervision, we don't currently have tools established to vary supervision intervals based on safety risk. The introduction of the term would, at this time, only cause more confusion among FAA personnel charged with carrying out ODA supervision and oversight.  The FAA is investigating changes to our ODA supervision and inspection programs to effectively introduce safety risk decisionmaking into ODA oversight.  No changes have been introduced based on this comment.

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				holder. Unquote AIR-200	
Boeing Commercial Airplanes	5-6	5-4.f.(3)	The proposed text states:  "f. Flight Standards Supervision. The Flight Standards OMT representatives oversee the maintenance and operational activity through direct interaction with the organization. This requires visiting the organization. The minimum number of visits will be identified through the National Work Program and may be tailored based on the ODA holder's activity level. These visits may be performed in conjunction with other surveillance activity. During the visits to the facility, the Flight Standards OMT member will:  Flight Standards does not oversee the TC or PC, STC, or TSO function code activity. There are no function codes that list FSDO Oversight (O) in Figure 2-1 or 2-2 that involve "conformity inspections." The text should be revised to be commensurate with this.  (3) Observe ODA unit members performing aging aircraft records reviews, airworthiness functions or conformity inspections"	We recommend revising the text to read as follows:  "(3) Observe ODA unit members performing aging aircraft records reviews or airworthiness functions or conformity  AFS-600	The FAA agrees with the intent of the suggestions and has revised the text to:  "Observe ODA unit members performing aging airplane records review, airworthiness certificate and approval functions, or other delegated activities."
Don Johnson		8-3c	Before I begin my comments, let me say that I'm commenting as a damage tolerance DER, and these opinions are my own and do not reflect any other entities' opinion. I am strongly opposed to the 8100.15 Paragraph 8-3c change that gives Chapter 4 ALI approval authority to ODAs. This represents a huge shift in thinking compared to historical precedent. Currently, CFR14 25.1529 is reserved strictly for the FAA. DERs are not even allowed to recommend against this rule. I believe	Allow UMs to recommend [approval of] ALI changes only – leave final [approval ] to FAA.	While we appreciate the commenter's concern regarding approval of the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA), we do not consider the proposed change to be a shift in thinking or significant change in precedent.  ODA organizations, as well as their predecessors under the Designated Alteration Station and Delegation Option Authorization

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				(7004)
				(DOA) programs have always been authorized
				to approve <u>changes</u> to the ALS of the ICA.
				This is provided for specifically under function
				codes XX050. The proposed change would
				also allow ODA approval of the initial ICA.
				The proposed change is needed specifically for
				turbine engine projects, for which the ALS
				content is documented and approved in
				separate certification reports. This makes the
				ALS approval a transposition exercise
				requiring FAA resources that can be better
				utilized on other areas with a larger safety
				impact.
				The proposed language does not limit this
				authority to engines specifically, but does
				require specific FAA authorization to approve
		participation in the resulting limitations is a good		initial ALS. As such each ODA-managing
		thing.		office will have to determine whether the
		There will be greater temptation for ODAs		delegation of this authority is appropriate.
		cost, schedule, and customer convenience pressures.		The FAA believes the ODA system has
		Everyone believes in safety, but many times the		appropriate safeguards preventing undue
		justification for some of these limitation items		influence or pressure from impacting approvals
		might not be obvious to all of the ODA/company		made by ODA unit members. This applies to
		stakeholders. With ODA approval, these		not only approval of the ALS information, but
		stakeholders could convince unit members that		also all of the other safety critical approvals
		maybe compromises could be made. This could		that could be made by the ODA unit, subject to
		easily happen because often these limitations could		FAA review, if determined necessary.
		be modified to lessen the impact. The vast majority		·
		of UM/DERs would not be easily be persuaded to		We do not see any regulatory or legal impacts
		eliminate limitations, but sometimes subtle		from the proposed change. As noted earlier,
		compromises in wording can have big effects on		the approval of changes to the ALS, which is
		safety. Safety decisions can be a slippery slope.		already provided for in the Order, is subject to
		There are numerous historical examples where the		the limitations in section 8-4b(4) which
				prevents approval of a reduction of life-limits.
		catastrophic incidents where small changes had a		As the commenter notes, any reduction of life-
		1		limits requires FAA involvement and requires
		As well as technical issues, there could be		the issuance of an airworthiness directive to
	Page	Page Paragraph	that there are many sound reasons for this. Chapter 4 Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI) are where "The rubber meets the road" for aircraft safety. ALIs are the end product of a tremendous amount of engineering work, and are ultimately what keep aircraft safe. If ODAs are allowed to approve changes to these items, it could substantially increase the inherent conflict of interest pressure that unit members/DERs will encounter. Currently, the FAA is the final authority for approval of these changes, and that takes some of that pressure off of the UM/DERs. As a DER who deals with Chapter 4 items all of the time, I'm very happy to have another set of eyes reviewing that part of my work. Often, changes to Chapter 4 items result from Continuing Operational Safety (COS) items. These issues can be very complicated and having full FAA participation in the resulting limitations is a good thing.  There will be greater temptation for ODAs to cut corners for expediency. There are always cost, schedule, and customer convenience pressures. Everyone believes in safety, but many times the justification for some of these limitation items might not be obvious to all of the ODA/company stakeholders. With ODA approval, these stakeholders could convince unit members that maybe compromises could be made. This could easily happen because often these limitations could be modified to lessen the impact. The vast majority of UM/DERs would not be easily be persuaded to eliminate limitations, but sometimes subtle compromises in wording can have big effects on safety. Safety decisions can be a slippery slope. There are numerous historical examples where the aviation community has been surprised by catastrophic incidents where small changes had a big impact.	that there are many sound reasons for this. Chapter 4 Airworthiness Limitation Irems (ALI) are where "The rubber meets the road" for aircraft safety.  ALIs are the end product of a tremendous amount of engineering work, and are ultimately what keep aircraft safe. If ODAs are allowed to approve changes to these items, it could substantially increase the inherent conflict of interest pressure that unit members/DERs will encounter. Currently, the FAA is the final authority for approval of these changes, and that takes some of that pressure off of the UM/DERs. As a DER who deals with Chapter 4 items all of the time, I'm very happy to have another set of eyes reviewing that part of my work. Often, changes to Chapter 4 items result from Continuing Operational Safety (COS) items. These issues can be very complicated and having full FAA participation in the resulting limitations is a good thing.  There will be greater temptation for ODAs to cut corners for expediency. There are always cost, schedule, and customer convenience pressures. Everyone believes in safety, but many times the justification for some of these limitation items might not be obvious to all of the ODA/company stakeholders. With ODA approval, these stakeholders could convince unit members that maybe compromises could be made. This could easily happen because often these limitations could be modified to lessen the impact. The vast majority of UM/DERs would not be easily be persuaded to eliminate limitations, but sometimes subtle compromises in wording can have big effects on safety. Safety decisions can be a slippery slope. There are numerous historical examples where the aviation community has been surprised by catastrophic incidents where small changes had a big impact.

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			regulatory/legal implications to letting ODAs approve "mandatory" chapter 4 limitations. Currently, to make chapter 4 changes "mandatory" for operators that operate under previous revisions of the maintenance manual, the FAA must issue an AD. Under this new order, if the FAA must issue an AD to make chapter 4 changes mandatory, wouldn't the FAA have to somehow "approve" the limitation to issue the AD?  In conclusion, the analogy that immediately came to mind was that this change was like the fox guarding the chicken coop. This analogy may sound cynical to many, but speaking for myself, I eat, sleep, and breathe aircraft safety. Anything that I view as even potentially compromising safety is just not a good idea. We all should remember that the safety standard we are being judged against is perfection. It is a very high standard, indeed.		mandate.  No change has been introduced based on this comment.
Airbus SAS	8-19	8.9.d.(1)	Please see proposed changes in right column for wording consistent which makes sense for the AMOC process.	Airbus suggests to replace "is approved "by "applies" to read (Replaced text strikethrough):  Quote  (1) The affected aircraft model, serial number and owner/operator of the product. For a global AMOC, identify the applicable aircraft for which the AMOC applies is approved.  Unquote	The proposed language is consistent with that in other FAA Orders regarding AMOC approvals, and no significant clarification is introduced by the suggestion.  No change has been introduced based on this comment.

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Garmin	9-3	9-4.(2)	States that no ODA unit may: "Deviate from the FAA policy and guidance applicable to ODA unit's authorized functions."  "Guidance" is typically associated with Advisory Circulars, which provide a means but not the only means to meet requirements. While an AC's guidance may be one way to meet a requirement, there may be aspects to that guidance that provide a significant disadvantage if rigidly adhered to.  Retaining "guidance" in paragraph 9-4.(2) will hold the ODA to a more rigid interpretation of "guidance" than the applicant.	Remove the phrase "and guidance".  AIR-200.	The FAA does not agree with this suggestion. This reference to "guidance" in paragraph 9-4 (2) does not categorically make AC's mandatory. By the same token, there are many examples of "guidance" in Order 8100.15B that are clearly intended and understood to be nonmandatory. Since policy interpretation falls to the FAA, the "level of rigidity adhered to" in a given circumstance might warrant particular discussion with the OMT.
General Electric Aviation	9-3	9-4(1)	As written:  "No [PC] ODA unit may: (1) Perform any function on any aircraft, engine, propeller or article not originally manufactured by the PC ODA holder or that is not in support of the ODA holder's TC or STC projects".  The GE PC ODA will be authorized to perform functions on engines in support of TC projects for which ODA holder GE is not the applicant for a TC nor is it the existing TC holder. (Applicant-TC holder may be CFM Co. or GHAE Co. or EA Co. or CFE Co.)  Placing the 9-4(1) stipulation into the Order would potentially prohibit this needed & anticipated capability.	Order 8100.15B Ch1 should recognize that a large ODA Holder may be a principle partner in one or more Consortium JVPs, where the Consortium Company is the actual applicant for the FAA design approval and ultimately becomes the FAA Certificate holder.  The Consortium Company is not typically an ODA holder itself.  In such cases the ODA Holder's ODA Unit may be authorized to perform functions in support of that applicant's TC projects.  The ODA holder will also need to continue to perform functions on such products post-certification in support of continued airworthiness and operational safety.	The FAA does not agree with this suggestion. The current language is consistent with ODA intent. The work must be in support of the ODA holder's TC or STC project or performed on products/articles manufactured by the ODA holder  "The ODA unit may not: (a) Perform any function on any aircraft, engine, propeller or article not originally manufactured by the PC ODA holder or that is not in support of the ODA holder's TC or STC projects".  This language still allows for PC ODA approval functions to be performed on articles manufactured by the ODA holder, as envisioned in the consortium scenario.

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Boeing Commercial Airplanes	9-6	9-8b	The proposed paragraph would require submittal of airworthiness certificate packages directly to the MIDO. However, currently the Boeing OMT requires submittal of these packages to an OMT representative instead of directly to the CMO (equivalent to MIDO). The proposed paragraph in the Order should be revised to take this into account, or it should, at least, indicate that the procedure described may differ among ODAs.	We recommend that this paragraph be revised to require submittal of airworthiness certification packages to the OMT first, who then forwards to the MIDO following review. As an alternative, it should be revised to clarify that packages must be submitted by the ODA unit to the MIDO (or to the CMO, as appropriate).	The FAA does not agree with this suggestion. There is no need for this text to be so prescriptively written. Nothing precludes the ODA unit from coordinating closely with their OMT when providing this information to the MIDO. Also, an OMT may find it necessary to be more prescriptive in its dealings with an ODA holder.
Delta Engineering		11-7 (a)(7)(a)	What is the intent of linking to the TC holder?	Allow ODA's to have typical projects that only require FAA involvement for CAA, Off-site, EWIS (for now) without the link to TC. Have ODA's provide notice of all projects so at any time the FAA can "jump in".	The FAA does not agree. The review and FAA agreement to a proposed certification plan is a critical part in the certification process. While the FAA can be assured that the TC holder for the product has the necessary expertise and history to define major changes that can be accomplished without FAA review, we cannot have the same assurance for STC ODA holders.
Delta Engineering		11-7 (a)(7)(b)	FAA design approvals are not serial number specific unless one-time STC. Yes sometimes the type design will include a list of serial numbers but adding another serial number may not actually change design data except adding a serial number.	Remove item 7 or provide clarity that adding a serial number that requires major design change.	No change has been introduced based on this comment.  The FAA does not agree. While it is not customary to have STC serial number effectivity, this practice has been observed in the field. This change will allow the addition of serial numbered products to the STC effectivity without submittal of a project notification letter.  No change has been introduced based on this

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Delta Engineering		11-7(d)	First, while the FAA sees the ODA as a privilege the industry and many employed people because of the ODA's will not. The ODA system is very important to both safety (ODA's don't get discretionary authority) and economic progress for aviation. So not having accountability to get projects turned by FAA can have a big impact.	Add time requirement but change to 60 days for non-typical project. If ODA does not require PNL acceptance on typical projects than many FAA resources can be saved and used to post audits.	It is not exactly clear how the comment and suggested change relate. If the commenter means to address the removal of the 30 day requirement for response to PNL, then the FAA does not agree that a timeframe needs to be established for the response.  The FAA is committed to responding in a timely manner to ODA-related workload, including the timely response to project notification letters. We do not anticipate any significant change in practice by the removal of this arbitrary requirement.  No change has been introduced based on this comment.
Jamco America	11-15	11-8. a.(2)	This paragraph states that prototype installations may be authorized at CAA certificated facilities authorized to perform the alteration and approve the altered product for return to service.  Paragraph 11-6.a. on page 11-5 of Order 8100.15B states that "All prototype alterations on civil-registered aircraft (foreign or domestic) must be performed at FAA certificated facilities authorized to perform the type of alteration and approve the altered product for return to service in accordance with 14 CFR part 43."  These paragraphs appear to contradict each other.	Suggest revising paragraph 11-6.a. to align with 11-8.a.(2).	The FAA agrees with the suggestion. We have revised paragraph 11-6a to note that prototype alterations must be performed at authorized facilities and referenced paragraph 11-8 for information.
Jamco America	11-15	11-8. b.	This paragraph states "An on-site assessment is required for facilities that are not FAA certificated."  It is not clear if this is a requirement for every project regardless if the facility is incorporated in the approved procedures manual.	Suggest statement to be revised as follows:  "An on-site assessment is required for each project for facilities that are not FAA certificated unless the facility that has been evaluated has been incorporated in the procedures	The FAA agrees with the commenter. We have revised the relevant sentence in paragraph 11-8 to read: An on-site assessment is required for each project at facilities that are not FAA certificated unless the ODA holder has previously conducted an on-site assessment of the facility for the type of project being performed and identified the facility in its

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				manual in accordance with 11-6. b. of this order."	procedures manual in accordance with paragraph 11-6b of this order.
Jamco America	11-7	11-7.a.(7)	Paragraphs (7)(a) and (7)(b) address situations when a submittal of a PNL is not required if agreed to by the OMT.  Paragraph (7)(a) does not describe types of changes as the last sentence in paragraph (7) states.  Paragraph (7)(a) places emphasis on the modifier/applicant having access to the type design data of the product being modified rather than the scope of change discussed in paragraph (7).  Paragraph (7)(b) further limits types of changes not requiring a PNL submittal to an arbitrary set of constraints. Depending on the change agreements between the ODA and OMT, (b)1. and (b)2. could be considered minor though this order implies these would be major.  These limits set forth in paragraphs (7)(a) and (7)(b) don't appear to account for the STC ODA holders experience and performance regarding ability to manage routine projects. Instead this proposed change to the order provides a "one size fits all" approach implying all STC ODA are similarly experienced and perform at the same level and therefor are only allowed a defined set of situations where a PNL is not required.  Considering the types of activity that do not require a PNL submittal must be incorporated in the procedures manual and therefor reviewed and approved by the OMT and AIR-110, the ODA should be allowed to propose the type of activity based upon experience and performance instead of prescribing a defined set of situation for all STC	Suggest removing paragraphs (7)(a) and (7)(b) and revise paragraph (7) as follows:  (7) Requirement for Program Notification Letter. At the OMT's discretion, ODA holders may be authorized to conduct certain certification activity without submittal of PNLs. The scope and limitations of any type of activity not requiring a PNL must be defined in the ODA procedures manual and may only be authorized for STCs or major changes for which the OMT can establish beforehand that the project will not require FAA specific findings and that the ODA holder and unit have the appropriate knowledge and understanding of the product manufacturer's design philosophy, principles, operational assumptions and operator procedures. The ODA administrator must notify the OMT of any planned certification project if there is any question regarding the ODA holder's authority to complete the project. Procedural coordination requirements for CPNs, off site projects and the	The FAA does not agree with the suggestion.  Sub-paragraph (7)(a) does broadly describe a type of change without limitation by referring to "New or amended STCs". The intent is to allow for broader authority, including new STCs to be accomplished without PNL if the STC ODA holder has a documented association with the product manufacturer to ensure that all necessary data is available to the STC ODA.  While we understand the commenter's desire to be allowed broader authority for STC issuance without submittal of a PNL, the FAA has not yet established any standards against which to evaluate an ODA holder's experience and capability which could be used to bound this authority. Thus, authority for STC issuance without submittal of a PNL will be limited as proposed. The FAA would also note that, as mentioned in the draft language, CPN and other types of project coordination must still be satisfied, and would, in all likelihood, have the same effect on project development and schedule as submittal of a full PNL for new or amended STC projects.  While ODA holders might experience some benefit from not being required to submit PNLs, the same project planning and certification documentation must be accomplished regardless of whether or not a PNL is submitted.  If an ODA holder has sufficient experience and

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			ODAs.	use of foreign registered aircraft must still be complied with for all STCs and any major change to type design. OMTs may establish procedures with their ODA holders for the submittal of any needed information for that coordination without submittal and review of a complete PNL.	history performing a particular type of project, then the OMT is expected to adjust their review of the PNL and certification plans accordingly.
Bob Miller	11-17	f.	Many STC projects (or amendments/design changes) in the refurbishment business don't take very long or are on such a short schedule that there may not be 60 days notice to inform the OMT.	the ODA holder must submit preliminary information to the OMT identifying the facility, description of alteration, planned installation dates and any other information requested by its OMT prior to any installation activity or planned assessment site visit.	Special notification requirements are introduced to mitigate any risk introduced when utilizing foreign certified facilities, which requires significant planning if FAA resources are required for specific findings or FAA oversight at the foreign facility.  The associated lead-time must be accounted for in the project planning and scheduling for off-site projects at foreign certificated facilities.  No change has been introduced based on this comment.
Boeing Commercial Airplanes	12-2	12-3.C.(6)	The proposed text states:  "[12-3.c. Issue Airworthiness Certificates and Approvals. An MRA ODA unit may perform the following functions. [The ODA unit must comply with 14 CFR part 21, FAA Orders 8130.2, 8130.21, and this order:]   (6) Issue Special Flight Permits (function code 12066) for the purposes found in 14 CFR \$\frac{8}{2}1.197(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4), or 21.197(b). ODA units may not provide special flight permits by telegraph, facsimile, or other electronic means. See FAA Order 8130.2."  It appears that this paragraph has been revised to delete the permission of an MRA ODA to issue special flight permits, under Function Code 12066,	1. Re-instate the ability to issue 21.197(a)(5) permits under Function Code 12066 in Order 8100.15B.  2. If that permission is not reinstated, then revise Order 8130.2G (Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft and Related Products), Change 1, para. 223, to allow for the use of the production flight testing and customer demonstration flight permit to be used after original airworthiness certification, up to the point of title transfer, for manufacturers.  3. Provide guidance in Order	Non-concur: The revision only removes the ability to issue SFPs for customer demonstration flights from MRA ODA Function Code 12066. The ability to issue SFPs for customer demonstration flights is already possible under TC ODA Function Code 8066 and PC ODA Function Code 9066.  14 CFR §§21.197(a)(5) allows an aircraft manufacturer to apply for customer demonstration flights with specific conditions. These are contained in the regulation and further defined in Order 8130.2G, Chapter 4, Section 13, paragraph 4168. Both the regulation and policy state that a SFP can be issued for customer demonstration flight by a manufacturer if it's a new production aircraft

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			for the purposes found in 14 CFR §21.197(a)(5), "Conducting customer demonstration flights in new production aircraft that have satisfactorily completed production flight tests." Previous versions of this Order allowed such issuance. This revison has the basic effect of requiring "customer acceptance" as a regulatory requirement. We have several recommendations for revising this paragraph:  By no longer allowing the issuance of permits for §21.197(a)(5) under the MRA function code 12066, this revised Order has the effect of requiring customer acceptance as a regulatory requirement for the following reasons:  □ Order 8130.2G, Chg 1, Para. 223.b.(2), states issuance of a special flight permit for aircraft that have previously been issued an airworthiness certificate is a "recurrent certification."  □ The issuance of a Production Flight Testing and Customer Demonstration combined permit allowed under Order 8130.2G, Chg 1, para. 4167 and 4168, issued under PC Function Code 9066, is considered no longer valid when the airworthiness certificate (Standard or Export) is issued, as the aircraft is no longer under the authority of the Production Certificate. This results in not being able to issue a Customer Demonstration Flight Permit to a newly manufactured ticketed aircraft under ODA, thereby making customer demonstration flights following original airworthiness certification at the manufacturer not possible.	8130.2G, para. 801.b.(7), on how to complete an application for "transferable permits" for customer demonstration only, as allowed in accordance with Order 8130.2G, para. 4168.b.(3), so that Flight Standards can issue transferrable permits to a manufacturer, provided the requirements of para. 4168 are met. [Order 8130.2G, para. 4168.b.(4), seems to restrict the issue of customer demonstration permits to the MIDO when, if flown following issuance of an airworthiness certificate, it is a recurrent certification and should be done by the FSDO. Note that this is an issue for 14 CFR Part 125 aircraft, as many manufacturers do not have a Part 125 Certificate or Part 125 LODA authorization and, therefore, require a flight permit to operate the airplane in accordance with 14 CFR §125.1. There is no regulatory requirement for a manufacturer of Part 125 aircraft to hold a Part 125 certificate or Part 125 LODA Authorization.]	produced under a PC or TC, and aircraft has satisfactorily completed production flight tests. If these conditions are met and an SFP is issued for customer demonstration flights, the aircraft meets the requirement in 14 CFR §§91.203 to have an airworthiness certificate.  If a standard airworthiness certificate has already been issued to the aircraft, then the aircraft would no longer meet the eligibility requirements for a SFP under 14 CFR §§21.197(a)(5). If the aircraft has been issued a standard airworthiness certificate and meets the conditions of that certificate, customer demonstration flights could be conducted provided that the operations are in accordance with the appropriate operating rule.  No change has been introduced based on this comment.
Delta Air Lines, Inc	12-5	12-6.f	Reconsider requirement (Revision B) for MRA ODA that the administrator sign the 8100-11 prior to release of an aircraft for Major Repairs and	In order for the data for Major Alterations and non-structural Major Repairs to be considered valid and used for return to	The FAA does not agree with this suggestion. This is not meant to be a new requirement, but should have been established practice based on the existing Order requirements.

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			We agree that a Major Alteration requires the project data to be reviewed, and the -11 signed, due to multiple intersecting discipline areas, prior to release of the aircraft. But, we believe repairs (especially structural) can be approved by the Unit Member via the 8100-9, and the aircraft released prior to the review/approval of the 8100-11, while still maintaining the requisite level of safety. The net effect of the Rev. B change is that it exposes Carrier MRA ODA Holders to excess operational and financial burden, given the possibility of excess down time for an aircraft after a repair (especially on weekends), while the UM tries to coordinate with an administrator. This will drive the need for additional administrators and the necessary management, lessening the benefit to the FAA (additional oversight) and the Holder. The other possibility is that an airline may resort to calling in a DER, bypassing the procedural improvements that the ODA brings to the overall operation.  We are also concerned that the industry did not recognize the impact of this change in Revision B, as it was not listed in the Explanation of Changes section of the draft revision.  We would request that allowance for Major Repairs, at a minimum airframe repairs, be exempt from this policy.	service, the ODA administrator must sign an FAA Form 8100-11, which indicates approval of all aspects of the following, as necessary:	It is possible for the ODA holder to establish structural UMs with administrator authority for the purposes of completing FAA Form 8100-11's on structural repairs. This authority could be limited to repairs which have been predetermined by the ODA administrator to only involve structural aspects. The burden of identifying additional "administrators" with this authority would be very small.